$Unique_ID{USH01562} $Pretitle{131} $Title{The Iran-Contra Affair: Supplemental and Additional Views Chapter 11 Views of Cohen} $Subtitle{} $Author{Hamilton, Lee H. and Inouye, Daniel K.} $Affiliation{US Congress} $Subject{committees congress report actions affair executive secrecy upon } $Volume{} $Date{1987} $Log{} Book: The Iran-Contra Affair: Supplemental and Additional Views Author: Hamilton, Lee H. and Inouye, Daniel K. Affiliation: US Congress Date: 1987 Chapter 11 Views of Cohen The Iran-Contra Affair was a significant departure from the constitutional processes which normally control the operations of the Government. While the affair was an aberration in this sense, it also demonstrated a recurring problem which has afflicted Administrations of both parties - albeit without such bizarre, unseemly, and far-reaching results. When an Administration adopts objectives whose goals, however defensible, are at odds with actions taken by the Congress, or with its own publicly acknowledged positions, it embarks on a perilous course. Subordinates of any President are motivated primarily by a desire to carry out his wishes, whatever the obstacles. Without an appreciation of the balance between the branches, such subordinates may be ignoring the law, even if it means taking actions which violate publicly stated U.S. policy. Normally, there are enough checks and balances within the governmental framework that such anomalies are detected and corrected early on. In the national security area, however, where secrecy is necessarily a tool of the trade, there is a greater potential that secrecy will neutralize the normal checks and balances of government. This was clearly demonstrated in the Iran-Contra Affair. Part of the responsibility to ensure this does not happen rests with the President. He must provide a framework within the executive branch, particularly within its national security community, which ensures the participation of lawyers, policy and budget overseers, foreign policy and defense experts, as well as those with a particular perspective on Congress, in the formulation and implementation of policy. Secrecy can never be permitted to preclude or in any way constrain the advice needed by the President to make decisions crucial to the United States. Similarly, secrecy can never justify eliminating Congress as a "check and balance" upon the power of the Executive. The Constitution makes no distinction in terms of those matters which affect the national security and those which do not. Congress itself recognizes that some matters cannot be disclosed to the public without also disclosing them to our adversaries, thereby effectively negating whatever benefit or advantage to the U.S. which might otherwise accrue. So, Congress has established a framework for dealing with such matters outside public view, while at the same time bringing the public's perceptions to bear upon the problem at hand. When Congress is not informed or is misinformed, when it is advised of actions long after they have occurred, the system of checks and balances is arrested. Democratic government, in effect, deteriorates toward dictatorship. Ultimately, of course, the secrecy surrounding the Iran-Contra Affair was stripped away, first by the press and then by the investigations which followed. Exposure was inevitable, particularly in a world where information is so readily accessible and instantly communicated. Technology has miniaturized the globe. An event in a remote village can reach our eyes and ears in a matter of seconds. The existence of a free and vigorous press ensures that attempts to abuse or misuse governmental power and processes will ultimately be uncovered. Once exposed, the processes of government will intervene to bring about needed corrections. Thus, there is a certain inevitability created by our constitutional system, which guarantees both a free and probing press, and a resilient governmental framework capable of restoring the balance of constitutional power once it has been skewed. Indeed, this is the genius of our system and the essence of our democracy. With respect to the Report itself, any effort of this magnitude, covering a subject of this breadth and complexity, necessarily represents a compromise. It is particularly true in this case, with a Report which purports to represent a majority of both the Senate and House Select Committees. Notwithstanding the give-and-take which attended the preparation of this Report, I believe it is, for the most part, faithful to the record before the Committees, and also, for the most part, is fair in terms of its assessment of the events described. I do not agree, however, with all that is included in it. Indeed, it is doubtful that any member supporting this Report would contend that there are not a number of inaccuracies, omissions, or unsubstantiated contentions in these pages. There are also numerous places where the narrative unfairly characterizes, and draws unduly sinister conclusions from, the facts before us. It was not necessary to pulverize the facts in order to make the points at issue here. Overstating an argument frequently serves only to undermine its legitimacy. In addition to these general reservations, I feel obliged to comment specifically upon three portions of the Report where my objections go beyond what I perceive as isolated cases of factual inaccuracies or unfair characterizations. The first involves the discussion of criminal violations in the chapter entitled "Rule of Law." Although the Committees make an effort to explain why they feel compelled to comment upon violations of criminal statutes, I believe it is inappropriate for the Committees even to appear to pass judgment in terms of whether those involved in the Iran-Contra Affair were guilty of criminal violations. I would have preferred the Committees limit their discussion to violations of the Constitution and civil statutes, and simply list those criminal statutes which may have been violated by the events which occurred. By stating that the Committees believe such statutes were, in fact, violated, the Report intrudes upon matters more appropriately left to the courts and the Independent Counsel. I also question the inclusion of portions of the chapter concerning the National Security Council staffs involvement in law enforcement investigations. Those portions dealing with the actions of the Assistant United States Attorney in the Miami Neutrality Act investigation; a former Central American official and the Customs inquiry concerning its undercover source (Kelso), do not, in my view, demonstrate any improper actions either on the part of the NSC staff or the other executive branch officials who are identified. Perhaps they are included here to reflect the extensive investigative effort expended by the Committees. Those efforts did not, however, produce proof of malfeasance. Nonetheless, they are described at length in a manner which implies by innuendo what was not established by the evidence. Only one of these three incidents was mentioned tangentially at the Committee's hearings (i.e., the Miami Neutrality Act investigation). None deserves memorializing to the extent they are treated here. Finally, I question the inordinate attention devoted in the Executive Summary to the Office of Public Diplomacy and its activities in support of the Administration's policies. This matter received only passing mention at the Committees' hearings, and equally scant mention in the text of the Report. The prominence given to it in the Executive Summary is far more generous than just. Bill Cohen